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IV

ARGUMENT
I.
A "CORRECTION-OF-ERROR" STANDARD OF REVIEW,
NOT A "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" STANDARD OF
REVIEW, IS APPROPRIATE IN REVIEWING THE LABOR
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF
"PREDOMINANTLY"
Respondent Nancy M. Wood (hereinafter "Wood") argues that Petitioners
(hereinafter, collectively, "WCF") are subject to a "substantial evidence" standard of review as
to the finding of the Labor Commission that Wood's mental stress was "predominant."
Therefore, Wood contends, WCF must martial the evidence in support of that finding. In order
for the Labor Commission to make a finding that Wood's mental stress was "predominant",
however, it was required to interpret what "predominantly" means under Section 34A-3-106(2).
Indeed, in this very case, this court has previously determined that before it could analyze
whether the Labor Commission properly found that Wood's mental stress was not
"extraordinary", it had to first determine whether the Labor Commission properly interpreted
"extraordinary" within the meaning of Section 34A-3-106(2). Wood v. Labor Commission,
(hereinafter "Woodl"), 2005 UT App 490, fk 5-6, 128 P.3d, 41, 43-44. This court went on to
hold that the Labor Commission's interpretation of "extraordinary" within the context of Section
34A-3-106(2) was not discretionary: "The applicable terms of this statute are specific and
mandatory, and do not connote any discretion whatsoever. Because the Commission and the
Appeals Board are not granted any discretion to inteipret or apply the terms of Utah Code section
34A-3-106(1) and (2), we review the Appeal's Board interpretation and application of those
sections under the correction-of-error standard." Id., ]\ 7, 128 P.3d at 44. See also, Morton
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 585-86 (Utah 1991); Horton v. Utah State

Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 928, 932 (Utah App 1992), Luckau v Board of Review, 840 P.2d
811,813 (Utah App. 1992) (interprelmg Occupational Disease Act).
Both parties to this petition for review have relied upon hi le General Determination of
Rights of the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, \ 18, 110 P.3d 666, 671 for the proposition that when
interpreting a statute, the court must first look at the unambiguous and plain language of the
statute. WCF has already urged that the plain language of Section 34A-3-106(2) requires that
Wood show that the mental stress causing her mental condition arises predominantly from
employment when compared to non-employment causes and that, therefore, the mental stress
arising from her employment must be a more than fifty percent contributing cause to her mental
condition.1 The Labor Commission concluded, and Wood argues, that "predominant" only refers
to the stress that arises from employment. Stated another way, the Labor Commission
apparently interprets Section 34A-3-106(2) to mean that the trier of fact determines what
stressors arise predominantly and directly from employment only and then determines whether
such stressors are extraordinary. The effect of this interpretation is that it is not necessary to
compare employment related stressors against non-employment related stressors so long as the
employment related stressors are extraordinary. Such an interpretation renders meaningless the
word ''predominantly" in the statute. Under the Labor Commission's mteipretation, so long as a
Petitioner's stress is caused "directly" by employment and that stressor is extraordinary, legal
causation is shown. Whether the employment related stressors are "predominant" is, thus,

1

Wood appaiently does not dispute that undei this mterpi etation of "piedominanf, the mental stiess must exceed
fifty pci cent
2
Oidei on Remand from the Couit of Appeals, at 4
^ Oi perhaps, the Laboi Commission means that the tnei of fact fust deteimme whcthei any stiessois aie
"cxliaoulinaiy" and then deteimme whethei those stiessois ansc fiom employment Eithei way, the lesult of the
analysis would be the same

irrelevant. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that statutes should be interpreted so
as to render all parts relevant and meaningful and interpretations which render some part of the
provision nonsensical are not favored. See, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934,
936 (Utah 1980); Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).
Even assuming there are two reasonable interpretations of Section 34A-3-106(2), when
that is the case, then the statute should be interpreted "in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, % 17, 66 P.3d 592, 597. Moreover,
the statute should be interpreted with a primary goal of giving effect to the legislature's intent.
In reKunz 2004 UT 71, K 8, 99 P.3d 793, 794. A review of Section 34A-3-106(2) in its entirety
reveals that it was the legislature's intent to require a comparison between work related stressors
and stressors in life in general. Indeed, in Wood I, this court specifically determined that such a
comparison should be made. Wood I, f 9. Thus, the obvious purpose of Section 34A-3-106(2) is
to make a comparison between stressors from every day life and stressors from employment.
When such comparison is made, not only should the employment related stress be something
more extraordinary than encountered in every day life, but the employment related stress must be
greater than stress encountered in every day life.
Except for the findings of the medical panel, which were adopted, without objection, by
the Administrative Law Judge, nowhere in the Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total
Disability and Order dated July 30, 2003, nor the Order on Remand from Utah Court of Appeals
dated March 31, 2006 is there any analysis of and comparison between employment related
stress and non-employment stress. Thus, it would be impossible for WCF to "martial the
evidence" when there is no finding, within a proper interpretation of Section 34A-3-106(2), for

As stated m its opening brief, WCF does not dispute the Laboi Commission's findings that the woik Ielated stiess
was extraoidmaiy

which the evidence must be marshaled.^ On the other hand, undei a proper mterpretation of
Section 34A-3-106(2), the only finding by the Labor Commission is the Administrative Law
Judge's adoption of the medical panel report, which concludes that Wood's employment related
stressors, though extraordinary, are equal, and therefore not predominant, in comparison with her
non-employment related stressors.6
II.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE THE
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 34A-3-106(2) URGED BY
WCF
Wood also contends that the case law interpreting statutes from Alaska, California,
Maine and Massachusetts is not persuasive here. That argument is based upon Wood's
interpretation of "predominant" under Section 34A-3-106(2), which was discussed above. Since
the more appropriate interpretation is the one urged by WCF, WCF contends lhat such statutes
and case law interpreting them are helpful to this court. Moreover, even assuming that Section
34A-3-106(2) is ambiguous, and resort to similar provisions and legislative intent is not helpful,
then this court should look at public policy considerations in its interpretation of the statute. In
re Kurtz, 2004 UT 71,11 8, 99 P.3d 793, 794 (citing hi re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah
1996)). The aforesaid statutes, and the case law interpreting them as set forth in WCF's opening
brief, mightily proclaim that public policy requires that, for psychological injuries, the stressors
causing the same should exceed those found in every day life. Indeed, before the adoption of

' Intelestmgly, in Wood 7, WCF took the position that Wood failed to piopeily maishal the evidence suppoitmg the
Laboi Commission's finding that hei stiess was not extiaoidmaiy. Of couise, this coiut determined that maishahng
was not necessary because the Laboi Commission had failed to piopeily interpret and/oi make findings legaidmg
"extiaoidmaiy" undei Section 34A-3-106(2) Wood /, at % 9
6
Admittedly, the medical panel's leport, by its veiy natuie, addiesses medical causation, not legal causation Still, it
is the only finding that makes a companson between employment lelated stiessois and non-employment 1 elated
stiessors

4

Section 34A-3-106(2), this court reasoned that "[a]n abnomial reaction to normal events,
however, is not compensable where the abnormality is created by non-work related incidents".
Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah App. 1992).7
If this court were to adopt the construction of Section 34A-3-106(2) urged by Wood, then
a worker who has a history of mental illness that is primarily caused by non-employment related
conditions and stressors would be entitled to compensation when an employment related stressor,
though extraordinary, results in mental injury. Such a result would be inconsistent with the
public policy considerations expressed by other jurisdictions and in Stokes.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, the court should grant the relief requested in the
o

conclusion of its opening brief.

Respectfully submitted this
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dayofof <-TMi.>».
Jf&A

c

, 2006

A)rft.

Floyd WHolm, Attorney for Petitioners

Intelestingly, in suppoit of this public policy declaiation, this court lehed on the leasoning of appellate courts in
Idaho, Oiegon and New Jeisey
c
Wood aigues that if WCP's mteipietation of Section 34A-3-106(2) is conect then this couit should at least lemand
the case foi appiopnate findings based upon that mteipietation This contention ignoies the ALJ's unambiguous
adoption of the medical panel leport, which, although it is foi purposes of medical causation, does make a
companson of the extent of employment lelated stiessois as against non-employment lelated stiessois
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